本帖最後由 NV58 於 2019-9-25 22:49 編輯
There is a lot more to that:
1. This is not really the main reason. Whilst Wrightbus indeed lost out in the recent zero emission orders London - both Metroline and RATP London were loyal buyers of the B5LH/Gemini 3 combo before their recent order for electrics, we are talking about a loss of about 100 orders, which is not disastrous. In any case, they did win two orders of fuel cell Streetdecks, in London and Aberdeen respectively. So clearly they are not losing out as they made it out.
2. It is true that UK bus order dropped by about a fifth from 2017 to 2018, actually the 2018 figure were largely on par to the period 2011-2015. Orders in the UK peaked in 2016 and 2017, because of the spike of bus replacement in order to comply with the DDA deadline at the end of 2017. In fact, in both years the quantity of buses ordered were highest for at least the last 20 years, if not more.
If UK order is a factor, it is actually this year is looking to be particularly bad, with TfL running out of money, leaving few new bus orders in London, along with the financial difficulties of First, another loyal Wrightbus customers that stopped buying en masse. There is more on loss order in the UK, and I will come back on this later.
3. While the NRM production run does have an impact, the effect happened all the day back in 2017, and, in any case, TfL was only committed to by 1,000 anyway. So this is hardly a factor. In any case, 2017 was compensated by an excellent run of B5LH which Wrightbus bodied some 442 examples themselves. So the NRM effect really is debatable.
4. This is just one part of it. In the years gone by they have also invested significantly in their factory to boost production. While it paid off with the order spike in 2016 and 2017, as soon as order tailed off, esp. this year, they simply cannot sustain the cost base anymore.
On my points about, there are two factors that were overlooked:
a) The loss of the Singapore Euro 6 tender to MAN - The Singapore orders had been crucial to Wrightbus, particularly its production line in Malaysia, since 2010. In between 2011 to 2017, when the final B9TL was delivered, Wrightbus was bodying an annual average of nearly 250 buses for Singapore. Thus, this loss is far more disastrous to the business.
b) Wrightbus' recent built quality is noted to have fallen off a cliff. So much so that two of its loyal customers, Lothian and Metroline, turned to ADL and MCV respectively for their recent orders since 2018 and 2019 respectively.
c) Wrightbus actually spent significant money on R&D, which is evident in their development of electric buses (StreetAir), hybrids (Streetdeck & Streetlite HEV), their own product line, and even fuel cell buses. For a business of their size, they actually did much more than ADL, which is much bigger and, arguably, are smarter with their R&D by partnering well established suppliers (their partnering with BAE on hybrids are a prime example). For Wrightbus, being smaller, these kind of R&D is difficult to sustain esp. when the investment cannot be returned to profit quickly.
All told, it is clear that Wrightbus had bitten more than they could crew. The bloom of orders is the early 2010s, particularly 2017, turned out to its undoing.
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